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Ambiguity Defines the NPT: What Does 
“Manufacture” Mean? 
DAVID S. JONAS* 
I’m looking for a complication. Looking ‘cause I’m tired of trying. 






No question about it—the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
2
 
is complicated, with a healthy dollop of vagueness added to the mix. As 
opposed to the Foo Fighters, who apparently yearn for complications (as 
if they are difficult to find), in the NPT, this band of merry men would 
find exceptional fulfillment, since complications abound. For what 
appears to be a relatively succinct treaty, the NPT becomes more 
complex as one studies it. Although the NPT functions as the 
 
*   Senior Executive Service, Former General Counsel, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board; 
Former General Counsel, National Nuclear Security Administration; Adjunct Professor, 
Georgetown University Law Center, George Washington University Law School, and former 
Adjunct Professor at the U.S. Naval War College. B.A., Denison University; J.D., Wake Forest 
University School of Law; LL.M., The Judge Advocate General’s School, U.S. Army; LL.M., 
Georgetown University Law Center; M.A., U.S. Naval War College. The author previously 
served in the U.S. Marine Corps, concluding his service with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the 
nuclear nonproliferation planner. The views expressed herein are his own and do not necessarily 
reflect the official policy or position of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the National 
Nuclear Security Administration, the Department of the Navy, or the U.S. Government. The 
author wishes to thank Elizabeth Farrar and Lauren Chang for their superior research assistance in 
the preparation of this Article. 
 1. FOO FIGHTERS, Learn to Fly, on THERE IS NOTHING LEFT TO LOSE (Roswell/RCA 
1999).  
 2. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 1968, 
21 U.S.T. 483, 484, 729; U.N Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for 
signature July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 484, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, 169, available at 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf [hereinafter NPT]. 
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foundation of the current nuclear nonproliferation regime,
3
 it suffers 
from certain ambiguities that heightens its complexity and poses 
significant policy issues.
4
 A lack of clarity in such a vital multilateral 
treaty may allow states to adopt valid legal positions that bolsters and 
defend actions inconsistent with the spirit, if not terms, of the NPT. This 
article examines one of the many important terms in the NPT that 
suffers from such opacity;
5
 specifically, the use of the term 
“manufacture” in Article II has generated debate regarding the precise 
activities that this word encompasses.
6
 In relevant part, Article II 
requires that the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) party to the treaty 
not “manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons” and not “seek 
or receive any assistance in the manufacture” of nuclear weapons.
7
 The 
key term “manufacture” is undefined in the treaty.
8
  
Interpreting the term “manufacture” yields a broad spectrum of 
activities that are potentially proscribed under the NPT. Existing 
literature on the subject evinces no real consensus, but the majority 
view is that the term “manufacture” should be interpreted narrowly.
9
  
However, competing views have also arisen as to the exact scope of this 
narrowing interpretation, specifically, whether the prohibition on 
“manufacture” should bar only the manufacture of a completed nuclear 
weapon
10
 or include the construction of component parts of a nuclear 
weapon as well.
11
 There is surely a vast gulf between those two ends of 
the continuum.  
 
 3. Michael Spies, Iran and the Limits of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime, 22 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 401, 402 (2007); see also David S. Jonas, Significant Ambiguity in the NPT: A 
Continuing Issue, 40 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 37, 38 (2011).  
 4. Jonas, supra note 3, at 38 (“The NPT is fundamentally sound but suffers from an 
unfortunate lack of clarity in certain areas.”). 
 5. Daniel Joyner, Iran’s Nuclear Program and the Legal Mandate of the IAEA, JURIST 
(Nov. 9, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/11/dan-joyner-iaea-report.php (“The term 
‘manufacture’ as used in Article II has been the subject of some controversy regarding its 
interpretation.”). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.; Jonas, supra note 3, at 46. 
 8. NPT, supra note 2. 
 9. See Joyner, supra note 5; Spies, supra note 3, at 407. 
 10. Spies, supra note 3, at 407. 
 11. Joyner, supra note 5; see Eldon V.C. Greenberg, Peaceful Nuclear Energy and the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, in REVIEWING THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY 
105, 119 (Henry Sokolski ed., 2010), available at 
http://www.npolicy.org/userfiles/image/Peaceful%20Nuclear%20Energy%20and%20NPT_pdf.p
df (arguing that construction of a prototype nuclear explosive device or components with 
relevance only to a nuclear device would tend to show noncompliance). 
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Arguments that interpret the term “manufacture” broadly, 
encompassing activity in the early stages of nuclear weapons design,
12
 
are premised on the belief that it is best to “err on the side of caution or 
restraint and apply . . . restrictions to facilities and materials which pose 
unacceptable proliferation risks . . . .”
13
 Whether the term “manufacture” 
is interpreted narrowly or broadly produces significant policy 
consequences. For example, the interpretation determines the nuclear 
activities in which NNWS may lawfully engage in, including energy 
development as well as the extent to which the United States and its 
allies may rely on the NPT to discourage illegal nuclear weapons 
development by NNWS.
14
 The interpretation of the term would also 
implicate the extent to which the United States and other states may 
lawfully assist NNWS in nuclear related activities.
15
  
Professor Joyner, a noted scholar in this area, argues that the term 
“manufacture” in Article II of the NPT should be interpreted narrowly 
in an effort to flesh out the nature of the issue.
16
 Few existing articles 
address the ambiguity resulting from the use of the term “manufacture” 







 discussed in section B, infra. Numerous Lexis 
and Westlaw searches of relevant terms such as “NPT,” “manufacture,” 
and “prepare” yielded only a few articles that acknowledge the absence 
of an explicit definition of the term “manufacture,” but fails to delve 




 12. See Steven G. Stransky, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Pakistan: 
Interpreting Nuclear Security Assistance Prohibitions, 23 FLA. J. INT’L L. 1, 13, 34-35 (2011) 
(discussing arguments that lend support to a broader interpretation of the term “manufacture” in 
Article II of the NPT, such that it extends to “pre-manufacturing activity”); Andreas Persbo, A 
Reflection on the Current State of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Safeguards, EU NON-
PROLIFERATION CONSORTIUM: NON-PROLIFERATION PAPERS, Feb. 2012, at 1, 5, available at 
http://www.sipri.org/research/disarmament/eu-consortium/publications/publications/non-
proliferation-paper-8 (“A more functionally consistent interpretation of the treaty is that any fuel 
cycle activity intended to support the acquisition of a nuclear device would be a matter of non-
compliance with the NPT.”). 
 13. Greenberg, supra note 11, at 121. 
 14. Id. at 120. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Joyner, supra note 5.  
 17. Spies, supra note 3, at 401. 
 18. Stransky, supra note 12, at 1. 
 19. Zhang Xinjun, The Riddle of “Inalienable Right” in Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Intentional Ambiguity, 5 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 647 (2006). 
 20. See, e.g., Lewis A. Dunn, The NPT: Assessing the Past, Building the Future, 16 
NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 149 (2009), available at http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr_16-
2_dunn.pdf (“The effectiveness of ‘no acquisition and no manufacture’ as a constraint on hedging 
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Of the relatively few articles that do take a position on the 
ambiguity resulting from the use of the term “manufacture,” most argue 
that the term should be interpreted narrowly.
21
 Under this purported 
reading, the term “manufacture” would apply only to the actual 
construction of a nuclear weapon and not the numerous preliminary 
activities that may indicate a nation’s future plans to develop a nuclear 
weapon.
22
 Accordingly, this article attempts to respond to the gap in the 
existing literature by outlining these arguments and their consequences. 
The article concludes with recommendations for addressing this 
problem in the future.   
Current scholarship, minimal as it is, supports a narrow 
interpretation of the term “manufacture” in Article II of the NPT;
23
 a 
broad view, however, is equally supportable under the terms of the 
treaty itself. This narrow interpretation understands the term 
“manufacture” to refer to the actual construction of a nuclear weapon 
from its component parts,
24
 in contrast, a broader reading would include 
the preliminary stages of the nuclear weapons construction process.
25
 
The problem with the broader view is having to decide which of the 
many preliminary activities may be covered. Under a broader 
interpretation of the term “manufacture,” one could infer a nation’s 
future intent to construct a nuclear weapon from the nation’s early 
 
is weakened by the lack of any agreed definition of what ‘manufacture’ entails”); Andrew K. 
Semmel, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Alternate U.S. Representative to the Second Session of the 
PrepCom, Remarks to the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT 
Review Conference Geneva, Switzerland (May 1, 2003), available at http://2001-
2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/20282.htm (“[T]here is no clear definition of what constitutes the 
‘manufacture or acquisition’ of a nuclear weapon”); LEONARD WEISS, THE NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION TREATY: STRENGTHS AND GAPS (Air Univ. Press 1996), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/fp/b19ch2.htm (stating that the lack of definitive interpretation of 
key terms, including manufacture, is a key problem that runs throughout the NPT); Maris A. 
Vinovskis, Non-Proliferation Treaty: Framework for Nuclear Arms Control, 11 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 279, 280 (1969), available at http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol11/iss1/16 (“One of 
the weaknesses of the treaty is that many of the terms used have not been defined and are likely to 
cause problems of interpretation in the future. For example . . . the meaning of ‘manufacture’ is 
extremely difficult to ascertain. Does the manufacture of weapons refer only to the final assembly 
of the nuclear device or does it also cover the numerous preliminary steps such as the operational 
decisions to build plants and conduct tests?”).  
 21. Joyner, supra note 5. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. (“Thus, my interpretation above of the Article II term ‘manufacture,’ which focuses 
on actus reus and does not focus on intent, is more persuasive from both an evidentiary and 
substantive perspective.”) (emphasis added). 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id. 
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“concept, capacity building, design, research and experimentation 
stages.”
26
 In analyzing the proper meaning of the term “manufacture,” 
the following section argues that the term “manufacture” should be 
interpreted narrowly according to: (a) the plain meaning of the NPT; (b) 
the negotiating history of the NPT; (c) the U.S. ratification history of 
the NPT; (d) the subsequent action by states party to the NPT; and (e) 
the problematic counterarguments that have been advanced in support 
of a broader reading of the term “manufacture.”
27
 
A. Plain Meaning 
To determine the meaning of the term “manufacture,” one begins 
by looking to the plain meaning of the term pursuant to Articles 31 and 
32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).
28
 In the 
VCLT, Article 31 requires that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms 
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”
29
 
We must, however, look further because the plain meaning here could 
be, as discussed above, a broad or narrow interpretation of the term.
30
 
Article 32 of the VCLT provides for a supplementary means of 
interpretation, which includes the “preparatory work of the treaty and 
the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of Article 31.”
31
  
In interpreting Article II, the plain meaning of the term 
“manufacture” certainly refers to physical construction.
32
 Joyner has 
argued that the term “manufacturer” in the NPT “refers to the physical 
construction of a nuclear explosive device, or perhaps at its broadest 
reading, to the physical construction of the component parts of a nuclear 
explosive device.”
33
 Stransky also offers a plain meaning of 
“manufacture” based on physical construction, stating that: “[a] 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 [hereinafter VCLT]; see also David S. Jonas, General and Complete 
Disarmament: Not Just for Nuclear Weapons States Anymore, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 587, 600 
(2012) (“Any exploration of treaty obligations begins with Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).”). 
 29. Id. art. 31; see also Stransky, supra note 12, at 19 (citing the VCLT). 
 30. Id.; Joyner, supra note 5. 
 31. VCLT, supra note 28, art. 32. 
 32. Joyner, supra note 5.  
 33. Persbo, supra note 12, at 4.  
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common understanding of ‘manufacture’ was a ‘process of making 
products by hand or machinery.’”
34
 
Thus, the plain meaning of “manufacture” in Article II suggests 
that the term should be read narrowly. Consequently, a narrow reading 
of “manufacture” fails to encompass preliminary activities related to the 
research and development of a nuclear weapon, even if such activities 
might later be used in the construction of a nuclear weapon.
35
 If the 
drafters of the NPT intended to reach farther back into the earlier stages 
of weapon development, they could have used other terminology, such 
as “preparing for assembly.” Stated otherwise, the term “manufacture” 
does not “reach far back along the knowledge acquisition and 
development line of a nuclear weapons program to the concept, capacity 
building, design, research and experimentation stages.”
36
 As discussed 
below, the narrowed plain meaning of the term “manufacture” 
significantly impacts which activities of NNWS would fall within the 
scope of the NPT. 
B. Negotiating History 
The negotiating history of the NPT supports a narrow view of the 
definition of manufacture.
37
 The VCLT considers the travaux 
préparatoire an important means of deciphering ambiguous treaty 
terminology.
38
 Not only do all drafts of the NPT include a prohibition on 
the manufacture of nuclear weapons as noted in Mohamed Shaker’s 
treatise,
39
 but the negotiating history of the NPT also reveals a deliberate 
effort to incorporate terminology reflecting the narrower view of the 
 
 34. Id. at 21 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1117 (4th ed. 1951).). 
 35. Joyner, supra note 5. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. 
 38. VCLT, supra note 28, art. 32 (the term “travaux préparatoire” refers to the official 
record of the treaty negotiations). 
 39. MOHAMED I. SHAKER, THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: ORIGIN AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 1959-1979 249 (Oceana Publications Inc. 1980) [hereinafter SHAKER] (In his 
seminal treatise on the negotiating history of the NPT, Mohamed Shaker offers this interesting 
vignette about the drafting of Article II, and in particular, the term “manufacture:” “the 
prohibition on manufacture was envisaged in all the previous treaty drafts. The Soviet draft of 24 
September 1965 also envisaged the undertaking by the States ‘not possessing nuclear weapons’ 
not to ‘prepare for the manufacture’ of nuclear weapons. The American draft as amended on 21 
March 1966 included the preparations for the manufacture but only with respect to the prohibition 
on assistance. This means that non-nuclear-weapon States would have been allowed, under the 
American draft, to prepare for the manufacture of nuclear weapons as long as no assistance was 
provided from outside.”). 
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meaning of “manufacture.” In analyzing the negotiating history of the 
NPT, one can see that the drafters distinguished between the terms 
“manufacture” and “prepare for the manufacture” before ultimately 
deciding to use the narrower term “manufacture.”
40
   
“Manufacture” was the more limited term; it focused “more to the 
later steps of actual fabrication, construction, and assembly of the 
component parts of a nuclear weapon, and to the completion of the full 
device from those component parts.”
41
 Interestingly enough, even that 
sentence, with its intention to clarify the matter, is itself ambiguous. 
That is, it establishes several elements of manufacture: fabrication, 
construction, assembly, and completion. Does it mean that one has 
“manufactured” a weapon only after completion of all four steps, or is 
each separate step considered “manufacture?” “Prepare for the 
manufacture,” in contrast, was the more expansive term. This phrase 
“clearly sought to include earlier steps on the ladder of development of 
a nuclear weapon, including the concept, capacity building, design, 
research and experimentation steps.”
42
 Again, there are many 
intermediate steps between “capacity building” and “completion of the 
assembly.” Even if the NPT drafters did not intend to regulate “capacity 
building,” perhaps they intended to prohibit other intermediate stages.  
Various drafts of the NPT included alternating uses of the terms 
“manufacture” and “prepare for the manufacture.”
43
 Interestingly, the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, a related treaty, does not regulate 
“military preparations” for the use of chemical weapons.
44
 A 1965 
Soviet draft of the NPT included a provision mandating that NNWS 
could not “prepare for the manufacture” of nuclear weapons.
45
 
Furthermore, a 1966 American draft suggested allowing NNWS “to 
prepare for the manufacture of nuclear weapons as long as no assistance 
 
 40. Joyner, supra note 5. (“[I]n the early U.S. and Soviet drafts, there was a distinction 
clearly drawn between the terms ‘manufacture’ and ‘prepare for the manufacture.’ . . . the fact 
that both terms had been considered by the drafters, and that the term ‘manufacture’ was 
eventually agreed upon by all NPT treaty parties, confirms the limited meaning of the term.”).  
 41. Joyner, supra note 5.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Sept. 3, 1992, 1974 U.N.T.S. 
45, 32 I.L.M. 800. 
 45. Id.; see also Stransky, supra note 12, at 30 (“The Soviets’ September 24, 1965 draft . . . 
prohibited NWS from providing assistance to NNWS ‘in preparations for the manufacture’ of 
nuclear weapons . . . .”). 
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was provided from outside [nations].”
46
 “The fact that both terms were 
considered by the drafters, and that the term ‘manufacture’ was the term 
ultimately agreed upon by all NPT treaty parties confirm the limited 
meaning of the term.”
47
 Therefore, the drafters’ eventual decision to 
reject the broader term, “prepare for the manufacture,” in favor of the 
narrower term demonstrates a definitive intent to limit the activities 
proscribed by Article II of the NPT. 
By evaluating the negotiating history, it is apparent that the 1966 
American draft “apparently initiated the use of ‘manufacture,’ as 
opposed to ‘prepare to manufacture . . . . ’”
48
 “This fact is rather ironic 
in light of the current efforts led by the United States to expand the 
meaning of ‘manufacture’ to include steps that would have much more 
persuasively been included in the term ‘prepare to manufacture,’ which 
was previously proposed by the Soviet Union for inclusion in the NPT 
and rejected by U.S. drafters.”
49
 
Existing literature supports the view that the term “manufacture” 
should be interpreted narrowly, as confirmed by the negotiating history 
of the NPT.
50
 For example, Professor Spies contends that a narrow 
reading of the term “manufacture” should prevail.
51
 Specifically, Spies 
states that the term “suggest[s] a completed nuclear explosive device . . . 
as some negotiating parties had originally remarked.”
52
  Spies also notes 
of the terms  “manufacture” and “prepare for the manufacture” being 
distinguished and compared before ultimately deciding to use the 
narrower term, “manufacture,” as evidenced by the drafters’ rejection of 
a Soviet proposal to ban the “‘preparation” for the manufacture of a 
nuclear weapon.”
53
 Here, however, Spies suggests that only a completed 
nuclear weapon, as opposed to the manufactured component parts of a 





 46. Joyner, supra note 5 (internal quotations marks omitted). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See, e.g., Spies, supra note 3, at 407; Stransky, supra note 12, at 31; see also Statute of 
the International Court of Justice art. 38, para. 1(d) (referring to “the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law”). 
 51. Spies, supra note 3, at 407. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 409. 
 54. Id. at 407. 
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Like Professors Joyner and Spies, Professor Stransky notes that 
excluding the term “preparation to manufacture” followed by the 
rejection of the “preparation for the manufacture” language in the 1965 
Soviet draft supports an argument that the NPT precludes only the 
actual construction of a nuclear weapon.
55
 Stransky thus states that this 
“ambiguity in distinguishing between ‘manufacturing’ and ‘pre-
manufacturing’ activity . . . creates more flexibility in interpreting 
acceptable behavior” under the NPT.
56
 In further discussing the 
consequences of this ambiguity, Stransky also notes the arguments 
made by the Swedish delegation about the difficulty in distinguishing 
manufacturing from pre-manufacturing activity.
57
 
Although Professor Xinjun’s article on the NPT refrains from 
explicitly advocating for a narrow reading of the term “manufacture,” 
he nevertheless comments on the continued ambiguity surrounding the 
use of the term “manufacture” based on the NPT’s negotiating history.
58
 
Xinjun acknowledges the competing interpretations of the term 
“manufacture’s” usage
59
 and discusses how the narrow view requires 
 
 55. Stransky, supra note 12, at 30-31 (“Despite these concerns, the final version of the NPT 
to which the United States and Soviet Union agreed upon omits any ‘reference at all to 
preparations for manufacture, either in relation to prohibited nuclear-weapon state assistance or to 
prohibited non-nuclear-weapon state activities.’ Based on the fact that the NPT specifically 
excludes the ‘preparation to manufacture’ restriction that was in two previous drafts, one can 
credibly argue that the NPT does not prohibit NWS from ‘assist[ing], encourag[ing], or 
induc[ing]’ a NNWS in pre-manufacturing efforts.”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. (“[T]he Swedish delegation focused on international assistance and the risks 
associated with pre-manufacturing nuclear developments. For example, Swiss Representative 
Myrdal stated that manufacturing nuclear weapons is comparable to a ‘long ladder with many 
rungs’ and that ‘the practical question is: on which of these is it reasonable and feasible to 
introduce international blocking?’ Representative Myrdal warned that to ‘prohibit just the final 
act of ‘manufacture’ would seem to come late in these long chains of decisions.’”) (citing 
SHAKER, supra note 39, at 250).  
 58. Xinjun, supra note 19, at 647 (“Yet, revisiting the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons travaux préparatoires of Article IV of the inalienable right reveals a strong 
intention of the dominant negotiating States to advocate ambiguity.”); see also Xinjun, supra note 
19, at 649-51 (“The article will then investigate the NPT travaux préparatoires recorded in 
United Nations Documents and Official Records to see how ambiguity have been made on the 
wording of ‘inalienable right,’ ‘the right to participate,’ as well as the relevant wording of 
‘manufacture’ in Articles I and II.” (emphasis added)). Specifically, Xinjun argues that the 
“inalienable right” provision of Article IV (which entitles parties to pursue the “peaceful 
application of nuclear energy”) reveals the drafters’ intention to leave ambiguous provisions 
within the NPT, although the article also references the use of the term “manufacture.” 
 59. Id. at 651. 
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“actual” manufacture of a nuclear weapon.
60
 Xinjun notes that the 
narrow interpretation was espoused by “some U.S. nonproliferation 
experts” despite their pro-nonproliferation stance,
61
 and goes on to 
acknowledge criticisms that such a narrow interpretation would render 
the treaty ineffectual.
62
 Xinjun further introduces some consequences of 
this ambiguity, stating that “[t]he fear from NNWS was that their 
‘inalienable right’ [to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy] might be 
restricted by Article II: because Article II prohibited them from 
manufacturing nuclear weapons, some manufacturing activities could 
no longer be exercised.”
63
 In Xinjun’s assessment, although the drafters 
of the NPT “prima facie precluded the ban on manufacturing 
preparation” when they rejected the term “prepare for the manufacture” 
in the 1965 Soviet draft, the “final phase of ‘manufacture’ remains 
unclear” in the final version of the NPT.
64
 His observation is wise 
because, as noted earlier, the term “manufacture” could conceivably 
encompass activities such as uranium mining and milling. 
Xinjun supplements his analysis with more support from the 
negotiating history of the NPT, specifically, the clarification of the term 
“manufacture.”
65
 Notably, the Swiss representative attempted to 
“clarify” the term “manufacture” “by enumerating certain ‘sensitive’ 
nuclear activities as not within the scope of the prohibited 
manufacturing.”
66
 Indeed, it appears logical to differentiate between 
 
 60. Id. at 652-53 (“F. Barnaby, the then director of the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, pointed out that an act in preparation for manufacture, even in a case that came 
close to weaponry, did not necessarily mean the banned ‘manufacture’ in Article II. Sensitive 
nuclear activities would be safe from the treaty ban. Barnaby wrote, ‘A party to the NPT could 
legally manufacture the components of any number of nuclear weapons, and the non-nuclear parts 
of the weapons could be assembled. Only when the fissile material was placed into one of the 
devices would the Treaty be broken.’”). 
 61. Id. at 653 (“Ironically, some U.S. nonproliferation experts shared this view regardless of 
their pro-nonproliferation position. The early response of the U.S. towards European sensitive 
nuclear exports was marked as ‘spreading the bomb without quite breaking the rules,’ viewing 
sensitive nuclear exports as not falling in the scope of prohibition in Article I and Article II.”).  
 62. Id. (“Leonard S. Spector criticized that such interpretation ‘would make a mockery of 
their commitments to renounce nuclear weapons.’ He argued, ‘It must be made clear that the NPT 
commitment not to ‘manufacture’ nuclear weapons incorporates a prohibition on all related 
development, component fabrication, and testing.’”). 
 63. Id. at 658. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. (“The Swiss government worked on clarifying ‘manufacture’ by enumerating certain 
‘sensitive’ nuclear activities as not in the scope of the prohibited manufacturing. In an aide-
memoire to the 1967 identical draft, Switzerland requested such an interpretation to be confirmed 
formally: ‘the phrase ‘to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
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manufacturing dual use equipment and equipment that could only be 
useful for nuclear weapons.
67
 In addition, Xinjun describes both Soviet 
and U.S. efforts to ensure that NNWS could pursue activities for the 
peaceful acquisition of nuclear energy without violating the NPT’s 
restriction on the “manufacture” of nuclear weapons,
68
 implicitly 
supporting an argument for the narrower reading of the term 
“manufacture.” However, Xinjun notes that such statements “had a 




Nevertheless, an evaluation of the negotiating history of the NPT 
and the existing literature describing the negotiations shows that the use 
of the term “manufacture,” as opposed to the broader term “prepare for 
the manufacture,” in the final draft of the NPT demonstrates the 
drafters’ intention to refrain from banning pre-manufacturing activity.
70
 
It would seem that the intent of the NNWS activity is crucial. If the 
intent is to build a nuclear weapon, then even mining and milling should 
be prohibited under the definition of “manufacture.” Without an intent 
element, such activities simply cannot be included. 
C. Ratification History  
The U.S. ratification history of the NPT further illuminates the 
ambiguous nature of the term “manufacture” in Article II.
71
 During the 
Senate hearings on the NPT, U.S. officials were “unable to actually 
proffer a definition of ‘manufacture.’”
72
 However, the testimony offered 
by William Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
 
explosive devices’ does not cover, according to the interpretation of the Swiss authorities, 
exploitation of uranium deposits, enrichment of uranium, extraction of plutonium from nuclear 
fuels, or manufacture of fuel elements of heavy water, when these processes are carried out for 
civil purposes.’”) (citing ENDC/204 (24 November 1967), ¶ (1)(b)). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 659 (“Knowing well the concerns from NNWS, the two co-authoring NWS tried 
on many occasions to ease such fears. The Soviet Union . . . announced, ‘we base ourselves on 
the assumption that a treaty . . . should enable [NNWS] to develop their peaceful atomic 
industries and all forms of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.’ The U.S. delegate to ENDC also 
emphasized that the fear for an expanded interpretation was not well founded. Foster pointed out, 
‘For example, the United States, as well as some other advanced civil nuclear Powers, have made 
available materials and technology for the building of nuclear reactors, the fact that these reactors 
produce plutonium that can be used in weapons has not prevented us from supplying these 
materials and technology under adequate safeguards.’”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 69. Id.  
 70. Stransky, supra note 12, at 31. 
 71. Id. at 17, 34-35. 
 72. Id. at 34 (citing SHAKER, supra note 39). 
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Agency and chief U.S. negotiator of the NPT, ostensibly supports the 
arguments made for a broader reading of the term “manufacture.”
73
 The 
testimony emphasized pre-manufacturing activity rather than the 
narrower definition supported by the NPT’s plain meaning and 
negotiating history.
74
 Foster submitted additional testimony in response 
to Senator Clifford Case’s request for clarification about what 
constitutes a prohibited nuclear explosive device as opposed to anything 
else that a NNWS could research and develop.
75
 The testimony hints at 
an intent element, based on the response of U.S. representatives made 
during treaty negotiations when asked similar questions: 
For example, facts indicating that the purpose of a particular 
activity was the acquisition of a nuclear explosive device 
would tend to show non-compliance. (Thus, the construction of 
an experimental or prototype nuclear explosive device would 
be covered by the term “manufacture” as would be the 
production of components, which would only have relevance 
to a nuclear explosive device.) Again, while the placing of a 
particular activity under safeguards would not, in and of itself, 
settle the question of whether that activity was in compliance 
with the treaty, it would of course be helpful in allaying any 
suspicion of non-compliance. 
It may be useful to point out, for illustrative purposes, several 
activities which the United States would not consider per se to 
be violations of the prohibition on Article II. Neither uranium 
enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable materials in 
connection with a peaceful program would violate [A]rticle II 
so long as these activities were safeguarded under Article III.  
Also clearly permitted would be the development, under 
safeguards, of plutonium fueled power reactors, including 
research on the properties of metallic plutonium, nor would 
Article II interfere with the development of the use of fast 
breeder reactors under safeguards.
76
 
The testimony of Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the Atomic 
Energy Commission, arguably implies a narrow interpretation of 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 35 (“Foster’s definition is concerned primarily, and most obviously, with pre-
manufacturing activity.”). 
 75. Id. at 34-35. 
 76. Id. (emphasis added). 
JONAS_FINAL_FOR_PUB 10/14/2014  2:20 PM 




 In addressing the inherent tension between Article V 
of the NPT (committing all parties to take appropriate measures to make 
available the benefits which may be obtained from peaceful nuclear 
explosions) and Article II (precluding NNWS from manufacturing or 
acquiring nuclear explosive devices, even for peaceful purposes), Dr. 
Seaborg pledged to make “freely available the information and data 
obtained” from the development of nuclear explosive technology for 
peaceful purposes “except information relating to the design or 
manufacture of nuclear explosive devices.”
78
  He stated further: “we will 
be prepared to make . . . available technical advice and assistance . . . to 
those nonnuclear weapon parties to the treaty which seek assistance in 
studying specific peaceful applications of nuclear explosions.”
 79
 This 
statement arguably implied that sharing of nuclear explosive technology 
for peaceful purposes would be permitted provided that the ultimate 
construction of the explosive nuclear device itself was not shared.
80
 He 




D. Subsequent History 
VCLT Article 31(3)(a) and (b) deal with treaty interpretation and 
discuss subsequent agreement and subsequent practice as the critical 
tools for determining the consent of parties to evolving interpretations 
of treaty obligations.
82
 The twin concepts of subsequent agreement and 
subsequent practice are premised on the idea that over time, treaty 




Existing literature also references the parties’ conduct since the 
NPT’s ratification as further support for a more limited interpretation of 
 
 77. See generally Statement by A.E.C. Chairman Seaborg to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee: Nonproliferation Treaty, July 12, 1968, in DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT 1968, 
PUBLICATION 516-24 (1969).  
 78. Id. at 522-23.  
 79. Id. at 523. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. VCLT, supra note 28, art. 31(3)(a), (b); see also Alexander M. Feldman, Evolving 
Treaty Obligations: A Proposal for Analyzing Subsequent Practice Derived from WTO Dispute 
Settlement, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 655, 657 (2005). 
 83. Feldman, supra note 82, at 662; see also ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND 
PRACTICE 191 (2000). 
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 According to Stransky, “[e]xamining state 
practice as a method of treaty interpretation has become commonplace 
in both the domestic and international arena.”
85
 To substantiate this 
point, Stransky quotes Justice Brennan in United States v. Stuart: “[t]he 
practice of treaty signatories counts as evidence of the treaty’s proper 
interpretation, since their conduct generally evinces their understanding 
of the agreement they signed.”
86
 Further, Stransky notes that Article 31 
of the VCLT states that “[t]here shall be taken into account, together 
with the context . . . any subsequent practice in the application of the 




Subsequent actions of states party to the NPT also support the 
narrow interpretation of the term “manufacture.” The fact that the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or the U.N. Security 
Council has not criticized Germany and Japan, industrialized states with 
mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle, for their nuclear capacity 
demonstrates that the term was intended to be applied narrowly.
88
 Of 
course, not being criticized for the steps they have currently taken also 
does not prove that they are insulated from such criticism or would not 
deserve criticism if they took further steps closer to a nuclear weapons 




E. Problems with a Broader Reading of the Term “Manufacture” 
Support for a broader application of the term “manufacture” exists, 
so much so that the term might extend to activity indicative of a state’s 
intention to manufacture a nuclear weapon in the future.
90
 A broader 
interpretation, however, requires one to make inappropriate inferences 
 
 84. Joyner, supra note 5. 
 85. Stransky, supra note 12, at 36. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. (citing VCLT, supra note 28, art. 31(3)(b)). 
 88. Joyner, supra note 5 (“In the practice of states since the establishment of the NPT, the 
cases of Japan and Germany and other advanced industrialized countries who have the knowledge 
and capability to construct a nuclear weapon, but that have not on that account been criticized by 
the IAEA or by the UN Security Council, are yet further evidence of the correctness of this 
interpretation of the limited definition of the term ‘manufacture’ in the Article II prohibition.”).    
 89. Vinovskis, supra note 20, at 279-80. 
 90. Joyner, supra note 5 (“Some would argue that this definition of ‘manufacture’ is too 
limited.”). 
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of a nation’s intent to develop a nuclear weapon.
91
 Unfortunately, it is 
not quite clear what the term “intent” really means as applied to a state 
or other artificial entity. It is difficult to translate human emotions to 
fictional persons. This highlights yet another aspect of definitional 
ambiguity. “[D]omestic legal systems . . . seldom if ever provide for a 
determination of intent prospectively . . . .“
92
 Such a determination poses 
a serious evidentiary challenge, as “it would be nearly impossible to 
ever show from evidence . . . that an accused state nevertheless intends 
in the future to manufacture a nuclear explosive device.”
93
 Rather, it will 
almost always “be just as reasonable, if not more so, to infer an intent 
simply to develop the knowledge and capacity necessary to manufacture 
a nuclear weapon, without actually constructing working components or 
a finished device.”
94
 Thus, a narrow interpretation of the term 
“manufacture” focusing specifically on the actus reus of constructing a 
nuclear weapon as opposed to intent “is more persuasive from both an 
evidentiary and substantive perspective.”
95
 It is unfortunate that this 
concept is not even mentioned in the NPT text. 
Not all states, however, embrace such a narrow interpretation of 
the term “manufacture.”
96
 A state might engage in activities that would 
fall under a broader interpretation of “manufacture” without actually 
intending to develop a nuclear weapon, thereby resulting in an 
overbroad application of the NPT.
97
 
There are important policy implications in interpreting the 
meaning of the term “manufacture.”
98
 In analyzing the final version of 
the NPT, the one which the United States and Soviet Union both agreed 
 
 91. Id. (“The problem with such an interpretation is that it requires an inference of a specific 
intent or purpose associated with activities that could be related to a nuclear weapons program. 
That intent must be to manufacture or otherwise acquire a nuclear explosive device.”). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Spies, supra note 3, at 407-08. 
 97. Id. at 408-09 (“It is conceivable for a state to engage in the activities listed above 
without necessarily attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. For instance, the same fuel cycle 
facilities used in a civilian program, which all states are entitled to pursue under the NPT, can be 
used in a weapons program. A state may have many reasons to pursue nuclear programs, 
including the prestige gained from mastering an advanced technology and legitimate non-
weapons military use such as naval propulsion, among many other conceivable reasons. Many 
state activities, such as defense and general welfare spending, can lack a strict economic 
justification from a critical outsider point of view, but such programs remain legitimate due to 
widespread domestic support and other subjective considerations.”) (citations omitted).  
 98. Stransky, supra note 12, at 30-31. 
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upon, some ambiguity arises in distinguishing between “manufacturing” 
and “pre-manufacturing” activity, given that the NPT specifically 
excludes “preparations to manufacture” restrictions that was previously 
included in two past drafts.
99
 This issue has the potential to be highly 
relevant if the international community ever seriously tackles the issue 
of nuclear disarmament. In that context, negotiators would have to 
consider what activities would remain permissible for former Nuclear 
Weapon States (NWS), specifically, which types of manufacturing 
activities would be allowed under a “nuclear zero” regime. In some 
ways, this is the mirror image of the subject of this article and would 
again raise the question of whether the United States should favor a 
broad or narrow interpretation in such a future context.
100
   
One could argue that the exclusion of the phrase “preparations to 
manufacture” left open the possibility that the NPT does not prohibit 
NWS from “assist[ing], encourag[ing], or induc[ing]”
101
 a NNWS in 
pre-manufacturing efforts. Stransky argues that the ambiguity in 
distinguishing between “manufacturing” and “pre-manufacturing” 
activity is significant given the flexibility that results in interpreting 
acceptable behavior.
102
 For example, during the NPT negotiations, the 
Swiss representative declared that the “exploitation of uranium deposits, 
enrichment of uranium, extraction of plutonium from nuclear fuels, or 
manufacture of fuel elements or heavy water when the processes are 
carried out for civil purposes,” does not constitute “manufacturing” of 
nuclear weapons.
103
   
Some states could claim that while such activity may constitute 
“pre-manufacturing” of a nuclear weapon, it is permitted under the 
American-Soviet’s version of the NPT given that the prohibition is on 
the actual “manufactur[e] of nuclear weapons” only. The ability to 
interpret a state’s actions within the narrower and relatively more 
flexible understanding of “manufacture” as opposed to “preparations to 
manufacture” provides important leeway for state officials in deciding 
what actions, if any, are appropriate to take in response to state 
transgressions. Ultimately, it is clear that intent remains the one 
unresolved element at work here.  
 
 99. Id. at 31; Spies, supra note 3, at 409.  
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. SHAKER, supra note 39, at 250.  
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II. HOW STATES SHOULD ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM 
 NPT Review Conferences (RevCon) are held every five years.
104
 If 
successful, the RevCon will produce an agreed text.
105
 This text, not a 
part of the NPT, would represent the political commitments from the 
states party to the treaty. Such text could easily include a point 
regarding the parties’ collective understanding of the meaning of 
“manufacture” and perhaps even an acknowledgement of intent’s 
importance in regards to a state’s pursuance of either a peaceful nuclear 
program or a nuclear weapon. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, this issue may have real world ramifications. For 
example, Joyner uses his argument for a narrow interpretation of the 
term “manufacture” to support the assertion that there is no evidence 
that Iran breached the NPT, as indicated by the recent IAEA report, 
because—based on current U.S. knowledge—Iran has not “physically 
constructed a nuclear explosive device or any of its components.”
106
 
However, beyond the immediate repercussions of this debate, the 
continued ambiguity arising from the use of the term “manufacture” 
raises questions regarding the scope of permitted uses of nuclear 
development and the reach of the NPT. What if intent was an 
anticipated aspect of the “manufacture” determination? If so, Iran’s 
intent is fairly obvious; it does not need nuclear power, as it is sitting on 
a sea of oil.  
In assessing the consequences of ongoing ambiguity about the 
proper interpretation of “manufacture,” Spies argues that any 
uncertainty arising from the term “manufacture” in Article II will not 
independently affect a nation’s compliance with the NPT, as actions that 
might be included under a broader reading of “manufacture” are 
specifically proscribed in Article III.
107
 In support of this argument, 
Spies notes that Article III requires fissile material, which is necessary 
for the production of nuclear weapons, to be placed under safeguards.
108
 
Despite the lack of a definitive interpretation of the term 
“manufacture,” the prevailing interpretation of Article II is that the 
 
 104. NPT, supra note 2, at 4. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Joyner, supra note 5. 
 107. Spies, supra note 3, at 407-09. 
 108. Id. at 409. 
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many activities a state must undertake to eventually construct a nuclear 
explosive, thereby indicating non-compliance with Article II, would 
necessarily involve violating specific provisions in Article III.
109
 Spies, 
however, maintains that the existing ambiguity of the proper 
interpretation of “manufacture” continues to create problems in 
monitoring compliance with the NPT.
110
 Consequently, this poses 
practical and policy challenges to the NPT’s ability to function as the 
foundation of an effective nuclear nonproliferation regime.
111
   
Based on the limited volume of literature addressing this important 
question, the plain language of the NPT, the negotiating history of the 
NPT, and the subsequent state action by states party to the NPT, one can 
deduce that the drafters of the NPT intended for the term “manufacture” 
to be applied narrowly.  Such a narrow construction would prohibit only 
the physical construction of nuclear weapons. However, this may only 
have been because an intent element was too difficult to capture in 
treaty text.  
Regardless of how the debate over the term “manufacture” is 
ultimately resolved, this is yet another example of a situation where the 
meaning of an ambiguous NPT term must be deciphered by lawyers and 
policy experts. The correct outcome would be for the NPT states to 
debate the issue at upcoming Preparatory Committee meetings and 
RevCons and to reach an agreement on the incorporation of the intent 




 109. Id. at 407-09. 
 110. Id. at 407-08. 
 111. Id. (“Although such a narrow interpretation of ‘manufacture’ is not accepted by the 
states parties, the lack of definitive criteria for what constitutes ‘manufacture’ continues to be an 
issue in the context of compliance assessment. During the 2005 NPT Review Conference a U.S. 
diplomat noted, ‘[i]n an extreme case, an NPT party might have manufactured an entire mockup 
of the non-nuclear shell of a nuclear explosive, while continuing to observe its safeguards 
obligations on all nuclear material.’ The U.S. diplomat suggested a list of activities of concern 
which would indicate an ‘intent’ to manufacture a nuclear weapon in violation of Article II. These 
activities include seeking certain fuel cycle facilities of direct relevance to nuclear weapons, such 
as enrichment or reprocessing, with no clear economic or peaceful justification; clandestine 
facilities and procurements; committing safeguards violations and failing to cooperat[e] with the 
IAEA to remedy them; and using denial and deception tactics to conceal nuclear-related 
activities.”). 
